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Abstract 
The  term  “anomaly”  played  a  crucial  role  in  Thomas  Kuhn’s 
characterization of scientific progress. For Kuhn, an anomaly is a 
puzzle  which  challenges  an  accepted  paradigm.  Puzzles  only 
achieve  anomalous status  once  an  alternative  paradigm becomes 
available which allows explanation of the puzzle. Anomalies were 
introduced into the finance literature by Michael Jensen but more 
as  resolvable  puzzles  than  Kuhnian  anomalies.  They  entered 
economics via Richard Thaler who saw behavioural economics as 
the alternative to the neoclassical paradigm. Both authors use the 
term anomaly in a deliberately Kuhnian manner. Kuhn formulated 
his ideas by looking back across the history of physics. By contrast, 
behavioural economists use Kuhn’s concepts in a forward-looking 
manner as a marketing tool for their ideas. 
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1.  Introduction 
Anomalies are events, observations or results that are apparently incompatible with a received 
scientific theory. They assumed a pivotal role in the philosophy of science as the result of the 
influence  of  Kuhn’s  (1962,  1970)  discussion  of  scientific  method.  In  this  essay,  I  discuss 
anomalies in the particular scientific context of economics and finance to illustrate the way that 
developments in the philosophy of science have influenced the methodologies employed. The 
main argument, which is taken from Kuhn (1962, 1970), is that anomalies are only recognized as 
such  once  an  existing  paradigm  is  challenged  by  an  alternative.  Anomaly  recognition  is  a 
component  of  paradigm  shift.  The  important  paradigm  shift  over  the  past  three  decades  in 
economics and finance has been the movement to behavioural economics and finance through the 
incorporation  of  insights,  methodologies  and  results  from  cognitive  psychology.  I  argue  that 
behaviouralists have appropriated Kuhnian terminology as a marketing device for their theories. 
 
2.  Puzzles and anomalies  
The importance of anomalies in the philosophy of science arises out of their centrality in Kuhn’s 
(1962, 1970) classic discussion in which he saw the identification of anomalies as a crucial initial 
element in scientific discovery.  Kuhn  refers to  theories or approaches which command wide 
acceptance and, implicitly, which have done so over considerable time, as “paradigms”. The 
neoclassical  theory  of  consumer  choice  and  efficient  markets  theory  in  finance  both  fit  this 
description. “Normal science” is the elaboration of accepted paradigms. Doctoral students and 
young researchers will typically conform to these paradigms since overt disagreement with senior 
colleagues is unlikely to generate appointment, tenure or promotion.  
“Paradigms gain their status because they are more successful than their competitors in 
solving a few problems that the group of practitioners has come to recognize as acute. To be 
more successful is not, however, to be either completely successful with a single problem or 
notably successful with any large number.” (Kuhn, 1970, p.23). Kuhn discusses both “puzzles” 
and  “anomalies”.  He  introduces  the  term  “puzzle”  without  inverted  commas,  and  so  normal 
English language usage is implied – see Kuhn (1970, p.36). He subsequently defines “anomaly” 
(Kuhn, 1970, p.52). For Kuhn, “puzzles” are problems which, “while the paradigm is taken for 
granted, can be assumed to have solutions” (Kuhn, 1970, p.37). Resolution of puzzles is one of 2 
 
the principal activities of normal science. Science progresses rapidly because its practitioners 
concentrate  on  (or  have  incentives  to  concentrate  on?)  problems  which  should  be  solvable. 
Nevertheless,  puzzle  resolution  may  entail  modification  or  extension  of  the  paradigm  in  a 
cumulative and incremental manner. “Anomaly” has become a technical term in the philosophy 
of science, but “puzzle” has not. 
Puzzles are problems or questions which demand solution and which practitioners regard 
as solvable. Anomalies arise when proposed resolutions produce results which contradict the 
reigning paradigm. Anomalies challenge the paradigm whereas puzzles provide opportunities for 
the paradigm to be exercised. “Anomaly appears only against the background provided by the 
paradigm. The more precise and far-reaching that paradigm is, the more sensitive an indicator it 
provides of anomaly and hence an occasion for paradigm change” (Kuhn 1970, p.65). 
Awareness of anomaly plays a crucial role in paradigm change (“revolution”) but scientists 
do not reject established paradigms solely because they are confronted with anomalies or counter-
instances. (Kuhn, 1970, p. 77).  Kuhn’s conceptual discussion becomes less clear at this point. 
My interpretation is that he is asking, When does an unresolved puzzle become an anomaly? 
Camerer and Lowenstein (2004) state that anomalies are “counterexamples that could not be 
permanently  ignored”,  but  this  supposes  that  the  counterexample  is  considered  sufficiently 
important that it cannot be ignored. Kuhn’s own answer addressed that problem. On his view, 
“paradigm-testing only occurs after persistent failure to solve a noteworthy puzzle has given way 
to crisis. And even then it occurs only after the sense of crisis has evoked an alternative candidate 
for  paradigm”  (Kuhn,  1970,  p.145).  Although  Kuhn  does  not  state  this  explicitly,  my 
interpretation is that it is only then that the results obtained in attempting to resolve what was 
seen as a puzzle become recognized as an anomaly. On this reading, anomalies are attributed 
retrospectively and in the light of the new paradigm relative to which they are no longer puzzling 
(Lakatos, 1970; Lightman and Gingerich, 1991).  
I have offered a Kuhnian account of anomaly, broadly similar to that of Frankfurter and 
McGoun  (2001).  However,  other  commentators  have  used  the  same  terms  with  somewhat 
different meanings Paradigm revision will often, perhaps generally, encounter resistance from the 
practitioners of normal science. Kuhn’s discussion views anomalies in a positive light as part of 
the process in which new paradigms emerge against the entrenched opposition of the scientific 
establishment. In Lakatos (1978), the same process is described in negative terms: “scientists 3 
 
frequently play down refuting instances and do not take a falsifying hypothesis seriously before 
the latter gets embedded into a higher-order rival; theory which explains also the partial success 
of the refuted theory”. In such instances the falsifying hypotheses, if mentioned, are “recorded as 
‘anomalies’” (Lakatos, 1978, p.176), a view Rabin (1998) terms “reactionary Kuhnianism”. 
The discussions of scientific method and progress provided by both Kuhn and Lakatos 
look back over the history of science and mathematics over the preceding centuries. As historians 
they reconstruct and as philosophers interpret developments already in the past. Matters have 
subsequently  become  more  complicated  because  scientists  often  carry  the  views  of  the 
philosophers as part of their intellectual baggage. This phenomenon is particularly in the social 
sciences where scientific credentials are sometimes regarded as suspect. The consequence is that 
previously innocuous terms, such as “paradigm”, “anomaly” and “research programme”, assume 
metaphysical implications. Later generations of historians and methodologists find that they are 
involved  in  a  two-way  conversation,  similar  to  the  way  that  politicians  sometimes  become 
dominated by the concern to influence the historical record of their achievements. 
 
3.  Jensen and Thaler on anomalies 
Frankfurter  and  McGoun  (2001)  make  a  persuasive  case  that  the  term  “anomaly”  entered 
Economics and Finance in relation to the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) with the 1978 
publication of a special issue of the Journal of Financial Economics (JFE) devoted to deviations 
from the predictions of the Effie4cient Markets Hypothesis (EMH).
1  In his introduction to that 
issue, the editor, Michael Jensen makes explicit reference to Kuhn (1962, 1970):  
“Yet, in a manner remarkably similar to that described by Thomas Kuhn in his 
book  The  Structure  of  Scientific  Revolutions,  we  seem  to  be  entering  a  stage 
where widely scattered but as yet inconclusive evidence is arising which seem to 
be  inconsistent  with  the  theory.  …  The  purposed  of  this  special  issue  of  the 
Journal of Financial Economics is to bring together a number of these scattered 
pieces  of  anomalous  evidence  regarding  Market  Efficiency.”    (Jensen,  1978, 
p.95).   
 
Jensen’s  discussion  relates  to  Fama’s  (1965,  1976)  statement  of  the  EMH.  From  this  time 
onward, the literature on what were previously referred to as “effects” has been referred to in 
finance as the “anomalies literature”. 
                                                 
1 Frankfurter and McGoun (2001) claim that the first recorded use of the term “anomaly” in finance is in 
Gentry (1975).  However, his usage is in relation to data and not results. 4 
 
Although Jensen (1978) makes explicit reference to Kuhn (1970), as does Ball (1978) in 
the same issue, his use of the term “anomaly” is closer to Kuhn’s “puzzle”. The evidence “seems 
to  be  inconsistent”  with  market  efficiency  but  is  “as  yet  inconclusive”.  The  EMH  is  the 
“dominant paradigm” in finance (Jensen, 1978, p.96). The anomalies are to be understood in 
terms of efficiency and the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Jensen looks forward to “the 
eventual resolution of these anomalies” (ibid, p.96). “The result will not be an abandonment of 
the ‘efficiency’ concept, nor of asset pricing models” but rather “a much better understanding  of 
these concepts” (ibid,, p.100). This is close to what Kuhn (1970) characterized as the puzzle-
solving activity of normal science. Finance was not seen as being in crisis and there was no 
thought of an alternative paradigm. 
Discussion  of  anomalies  moved  from  finance  to  mainstream  economics  with  Richard 
Thaler’s 1987 initiation of what ultimately became a series of 18 feature articles in the Journal of 
Economic Perspectives (JEP) – 14 of these articles were collected together in Thaler (1992). The 
first  article  in  the  series  starts  with  a  quote  from  Kuhn:  “Discovery  commences  with  the 
awareness of anomaly, i.e. with the recognition that nature has somehow violated the paradigm-
induced expectations that govern normal science” (Thaler, 1987, p.197). The reference here is to 
Kuhn  (1970, p.52) and the sentence quoted by  Thaler serves both to define  anomaly  and to 
summarize the historical process in a set of three selected scientific discoveries. 
 For Kuhn, anomalies are relative to an accepted paradigm. Thaler (1987, p.198) states that 
in economics the paradigm is “the belief that most (all?) behavior can be explained by assuming 
that agents have stable, well defined preferences and make rational choices consistent with those 
preferences in markets that (eventually) clear”. I call this the neoclassical economics although 
Thaler does not use this term. He claims that the anomalies he will discuss are inconsistent with 
the neoclassical view and he invites readers who can provide a testable reconciliation of facts 
with the neoclassical theory to submit these to him.  
Thaler does not reference either Jensen or the JFE special issue in his JEP Anomalies 
series despite the fact that the first two articles relate to EMH anomalies. This makes it likely that 
Thaler’s Kuhnian agenda was developed independently of the earlier contribution. While Kuhn’s 
conjunction of anomaly and discovery was retrospective and historical, Thaler’s agenda appears 
prescriptive and challenges the profession to come up with a superior paradigm. There is an 
implied suggestion that such challenges will be unsuccessful and that economics needs to replace 5 
 
the neoclassical with a behavioural paradigm. This suggestion becomes explicit in the concluding 
paragraph of the third article in the series devoted to the winner’s curse (Thaler, 1988).  Thaler 
writes  “The  winner’s  curse  is  a  prototype  for  the  type  of  problem  that  is  amenable  to 
investigation using modern behavioral economics, a combination of cognitive psychology and 
microeconomics” (ibid, p.210).   
Kuhn’s proposition was that discovery commences with the awareness of anomaly. Thaler 
reverses the causation so that anomaly signals the discovery of a new paradigm. 
 
4.  Thaler’s anomalies  
Different authors are likely to claim different sets of evidence as anomalous so a definitive list of 
economic anomalies is unattainable. Thaler’s 18 JEP articles therefore serve to define a working 
list. They are listed in Table 1. The list contains some duplication - the Ultimatum Game occurs 
twice and some other anomalies are quite similar to each other. I have divided these anomalies 
into four broad groups relating respectively to market efficiency violations, apparent rationality 
violations in relation to individual choice, violations of expected utility and violations of Nash 
equilibria in simple bargaining games. While my classification of one or two of these anomalies 
may be a little strained, in general, the distinctions seem clear. In what follows, I look briefly at 
the  allegedly  anomalous  behaviour  in  each  of  Thaler’s  four  categories.  However,  I  neither 





Thaler’s Anomaly  Examples 
Market efficiency   
   
January effect  Existence of profitable trading rules 
Seasonality in securities prices  Existence of profitable trading rules 
Parimutuel betting markets  Existence of profitable betting rules 
Mean reversion in stock markets  Existence of profitable trading rules 
Foreign exchange  Existence of profitable trading rules 
Closed end mutual funds  Violation of market arbitrage conditions 
Individual choice   
The winner's curse  Existence of systematic bidding errors 
Endowment effect  Selling prices exceed buying prices 
Flypaper effect  States spend federal grants largely on local spending 
Intertemporal choice   
Intertemporal choice  Variability of implied discount rates 
Equity premium puzzle  Excess of equity over bond returns is too large 
Preference reversals  Over-pricing of low probability, high pay-off outcomes 
Risk aversion  Expected utility theory rejected 
Saving out of windfall income  Excess sensitivity of consumption to income 
Bargaining behaviour   
Cooperation  Violation  of Nash equilibrium 
Ultimatum game  Violation  of Nash equilibrium 
Ultimatum and dictator games  Violation  of Nash equilibrium 
Interindustry wage differentials  Differing wages paid to similar workers 
 
4.1.  Efficient markets and related anomalies 
Thaler’s first two feature articles related to claimed of violations of the EMH. The EMH implies 
that asset returns are not predictable from their own history. It rules out both deterministic effects 
on prices and the existence of profitable filter rules. The most obvious deterministic predictors 
are those generated by the calendar, and “calendar effects” were documented from the 1980s. 
These include Monday effects, holiday effects and January effects – see Thaler (1987a,b). Three 
further papers in the JEP anomaly series deal with the existence of profitable filters. Oddly, 
despite Jensen’s (1978) emphasis on the simple EMH, the articles in the JFE special issue all 
looked at efficiency issues in more extended contexts (the CAPM, options pricing and stock 
splits).  7 
 
The “effects” literature has documented that calendar effects are pervasive both over time 
and space but that they are also typically very small. Trading rules based on calendar effects 
therefore have difficulty in covering transaction costs and the opportunity costs of time – see 
Hawawini and Keim (1995). There is also an issue of data-snooping – see Lo and MacKinlay 
(1990).  
Finance  practitioners  clearly  do  make  money,  and  this  is  indeed  a  major  reason why 
students choose to follow courses in finance. The EMH appears to suggest that the students are 
wasting their time – there is no money to be made. A slightly looser interpretation of the theory 
allows that there may be profitable trading rules but states that once the rule becomes known, it 
will cease to be profitable. In line with this view, Schwert (2003, p.947) states that “the weekend 
effect  seems  to  have  disappeared,  or  at  least  substantially  attenuated,  since  it  was  first 
documented in 1980”. He summarizes his review of anomalies with the strong assertion:  
“All of these findings raise the possibility that anomalies are more apparent than 
real. The notoriety associated with the finding of unusual evidence tempts authors to 
further investigate puzzling anomalies and later to try to explain them. But even if 
the anomalies existed in the sample period in which they were first identified, the 
activities of practitioners who implement strategies to take advantage of anomalous 
behavior  can  cause  the  anomalies  to  disappear  (as  research  findings  cause  the 
market to become more efficient.” (ibid, p.941). 
 
The weak form of the EMH makes very strong predictions and, in that sense, is easily 
falsifiable. On the other hand, as generations of finance students have discovered, there is no easy 
transition from classroom “refutation” to trading riches. Liquid financial markets do appear close 
to weak form efficient at least over short horizons. There has been no pressure for movement 
away  from  the  EMH  paradigm  and  the  claimed  EMH  anomalies  seem  closer  to  Kuhnian 
“puzzles”.   
The final JFE feature article included in this category, which relates to closed-end mutual 
funds (Lee et al, 1990), raises more interesting problems.. Present value theory relates the value 
of  a  security  to  the  expected  earnings  which  the  owner  will  be  entitled.  Valuing  a  share  is 
therefore  analogous  to  valuing  a  bond  with  a  fixed  number  of  known  coupon  payments  at 
predetermined  dates,  except  for  the  crucial  difference  that  the  size  and  timing  of  dividend 
payments  is  unknown.  Nevertheless,  in  principle,  the  dividend  process  is  knowable  and  this 
allows the investor and the econometrician to form expectations about expected dividends. 8 
 
  Present value theory is about values but not directly about returns. If true, present value 
theory  will  imply  market  efficiency,  but  the  converse  is  not  true  –  a  market  may  be 
intertemporally efficient, in the sense that returns are unforecastable, but nevertheless the prices 
may always be incorrect. There is a large literature, initiated by LeRoy and Porter (1981) and 
Shiller (1981), on tests of the relationship of asset prices to dividends, focusing in particular on 
the  reconciliation  of  low  dividend  variability  with  much  higher  equity  price  variability.  My 
interpretation  of  this  literature,  is  that  the  variance  discrepancy  between  equity  prices  and 
dividends cannot be taken as conclusive evidence against the present value model but rather 
points to possible time variation in asset price processes which cannot be explained within that 
framework. 
Because we can never precisely value firms’ future earning streams, a test of the present 
value model is therefore also a test of the model used to generate expected earnings. There are, 
however, two cases in which we can circumvent this problem. The first is the closed-end fund 
puzzle which relates to the discount at which closed-end funds trade relative to their asset value. 
Although we do not know the present value of the earnings streams of the firms whose shares are 
held in the fund, present value theory implies that the value of the fund should equal the value of 
its holdings, less discounted management fees. This is true of open-end funds (i.e. mutual funds 
or unit trusts) but not closed-end funds.  The twin securities problem (Rosenthal and Young, 
1990), which Thaler does not discuss, poses the same problem in an even more transparent way. 
A  small  number  of shares,  of  which  Shell  and  Unilever  are  the  best  known  examples,  have 
separate  shares  issues  on  more  than  one  exchange.  In  each  case,  the  earnings  of  the  two 
companies are divided between the shares on a formulaic basis (40/60 for Shell and 50/50 for 
Unilever)  and  dividend  problems  are  identical.  The  present  values  of  the  earnings  streams, 
whatever these might be, are therefore identical for the twin shares. However, share prices differ.  
The closed end fund and twin shares problems both feature prominently in the discussion 
in Shefrin (2000) and Shleifer (2000). Present value theory asks us to suppose that, although the 
academic economist cannot accurately know the value of a security, the market is able to do so. 
Since the true value of the security is unmeasurable, the hypothesis is difficult to disprove. The 
importance  of  the  closed-end  fund  and  twin  shares  puzzles  is  that  they  cut  through  the 
measurability problem by providing two alternative and inconsistent measure of value. Since they 
cannot both be correct, is there any reason to suppose that even one of them is correct? An 9 
 
alternative view, suggested by Shleifer (2000, p.87), is that values are, at least in part, determined 
by investor sentiment. 
To  summarize,  anomalies  entered  the  finance  literature  in  a  self-consciously  Kuhnian 
manner through the agency of Jensen (1978). However, in terms of a close reading of Kuhn 
(1962,  1970),  these were  more puzzles  than  anomalies.  The  closed-end  fund and twin share 
puzzles, by contrast, have posed a more serious challenge. They both suggest a role for investor 
sentiment in asset price determination, a view which contradicts the standard paradigm which 
seems values as determined by market fundamentals. The end-century internet bubble and the 
more recent sub-prime bubble add weight to these considerations. 
 
4.2.  Individual choice  
The theory of consumer demand is one of the jewels of applied neoclassical economics. Because, 
consumers purchase and consume a very large number of different goods, applied research has 
focussed on categories of goods (food, clothing etc.) rather than individual products (breakfast 
cereals, trousers etc.). Prior to the nineteen eighties, the bulk of studies were also typically on 
economy-wide  aggregates.  Many  of  these  studies  rejected  both  homogeneity  and  Slutsky 
symmetry. Consistently with a Kuhnian view, these rejections were taken as specification tests on 
the adequacy of the model representation rather than as evidence against the standard theory – see 
Gilbert (1991) and Keuzenkamp and Barten (1995). With the availability of detailed household 
datasets, more recent studies have been at the level of the household, taken as a unitary decision-
making body – see Blundell et al (1993) for a survey.  
Thaler does not refer to this econometric literature but looks instead at the winner’s curse 
in auctions and the so-called endowment effect whereby agents require greater compensation for 
a loss of a good than they will pay to purchase the same good. The two examples are quite 
different.  The winner’s curse, which is a violation of rationality, appears to arise out of agents’ 
failure  to  distinguish  between  the  expectation  of  the  value  of  a  prize  conditional  on  the 
information available to them at the time of bidding and the expectation of this value conditional 
on their bid exceeding all others. That distinction is not easily explained even to doctoral students 
so  it  is  perhaps  unsurprising  that  bidders  are  taken  by  surprise  by  auction  outcomes.  The 
explanation of the curse is therefore the limited ability of even intelligent human  agents. Its 
interest lies in the fact that systematic errors result. 10 
 
The endowment effect points in a different direction. In their JEP feature, Kahneman et al 
(1991) suggest that this effect can be explained by loss aversion. Framing seems a more plausible 
explanation. Despite the econometric success of demand theory, the foundations at the level of 
individual  choice  have  been  steadily  undermined  by  advances  in  research  in  cognitive 
psychology. This perspective is summarized by Shafir (2007): 
“Economic thinking about optimization concerns itself with things in the world, 
with alternatives as they really are (or, as they are best understood by a rational 
actor)...  The  problem  with  this  perspective  is  a  terribly  trivial  but  profound 
consequential fact about human nature: people do not choose between items in the 
world – they choose between those items as they are represented in the mind”. 
(ibid, p.292) 
 
At the most elementary level, prior to analyzing how agents choose between alternatives, we 
need  to  analyze how  they  construe  these  choices.  However, even  this  sequential  structure  is 
probably too simple since preferences appear to be constructed in part of the choice construal 
process – see Shafir (1993). This recognition opens the way to what are now well-known framing 
considerations – the way choices are portrayed and viewed can determine the preferences which 
are elicited or revealed – see Tversky and Kahneman (1981).  
 
4.3.  Intertemporal choice and choice under uncertainty 
Expected  utility  theory  (EUT)  straddles  economics  and  finance  and  unifies  discussion  of 
intertemporal choice and choice under uncertainty in a common additive framework. Importantly, 
it also has normative implications in welfare and public economics. Thaler’s JEP features include 
a  number  of  claimed  anomalies  relating  to  this  area  of  theory  but  strangely  omits  direct 
discussion of the best known problem in this area, the Allais Paradox. The Allais Paradox is 
important in this discussion because it took several decades before it assumed the status of an 
anomaly. 
The Allais Paradox appeared as a relatively minor component of Allais (1953). It involves 
the choice in two sets of two lotteries. In the first set lottery A gives 100 million francs with 
certainty  while  B  gives  500  million  francs  with  probability  0.1,  100  million  francs  with 
probability 0.89 and nothing with probability 0.01. Most respondents choose the certain lottery A. 
In the second choice set, the respondent chooses between C, which gives 100 million francs with 
probability  0.11  and  zero  with  probability  0.89,  and  D  which  gives  500  million  francs  with 11 
 
probability  0.10  and  zero  with  probability  0.9.  Most  respondents  choose  D.  However,  EUT 
implies that the preference of A over B entails preference of C over D, and vice versa. The 
selection (A,D) is referred to as the Allaisian choice.  
The violation of expected utility arises out of violation of the independence axiom, first 
proposed  by  Marschak  (1950)  which  forces  additive  separability  onto  the  expected  utility 
function. Independence applies to Allais’s example because the C and D may be transformed into 
A  and  B  respectively  by  substituting  zero  with  probability  0.89  to  100  million  francs  with 
probability 0.89.  The  independence  axiom  requires  that,  since  this component is common,  it 
cannot affect the valuations. In practice, the one in one hundred chance of zero in the context of 
what otherwise will be a large prize, affects the valuation  much more than an increase in the 
probability of no gain from 0.89 to 0.90 in a context where the likelihood of the large prize is 
small. 
Allais objected to EUT, which he referred to as the theory of the “American school”, 
more as a normative prescription for rational choice under uncertainty than as a description of 
how economic agents actually behave, a matter which probably did not much interest him – see 
Jallais  and  Pradier  (2005),  Hausman  (1992)  makes  a  similar  point.  For  Allais,  any  logically 
consistent choice rule satisfying “absolute dominance” (first order stochastic dominance) on the 
basis of objective probabilities could be considered rational – see Allais (1953, p.518). On this 
view, there is no more basis in logic for imposing additive separability on utility defined over 
choices  over  uncertain  outcomes  than  there  is  in  supposing  utility is additive  over  goods  or 
categories  of  goods  in  the  case  of  certainty.  Conscious  that  this  argument  might  not  fully 
convince, he constructed counterexamples where, he believed, evidently rational agents would 
violate expected utility (ibid, p.524). The example which subsequently became known as the 
Allais Paradox was one such example. He tried it out, apparently first, over lunch, on Savage 
himself who picked the Allaisian outcome, and then on other experts attending a 1952 Paris 
Colloquium  on  Risk  –  see  Jallais  and  Pradier  (2005).  Allais’  argument  was  that,  if  rational 
economists violate expected utility, expected utility cannot be a criterion for rationality.  
Savage, apparently shocked by his “error”, subsequently accepted that expected utility 
theory might not be a good description of how agents do choose under uncertainty, but argued 
that, nevertheless, it remains the rational way to choose – see Savage (1954). An agent who 
makes the Allaisian choice, should, once matters have been explained to him, realize that this 12 
 
choice was indeed erroneous. For Savage, the Allais Paradox therefore demonstrates only the 
limited capacity of human reasoning and does not undermine rationality, as reflected in expected 
utility maximization, as the basis for decision making.  
Matters  rested  there  for  twenty  years.  Wilkinson  (2008,  p.90)  states  that  the  Allais 
Paradox dates back to 1953, but this is to view history in the light of subsequent developments. 
Allais’ informal test was resurrected and performed under experimental conditions by Slovic and 
Tversky (1974). The first occasion in which the term “Allais Paradox” was used appears to be in 
Morrison (1967), predating the use by Allais himself in Allais (1979). Allais’ illustrative counter-
example became an anomaly only once the behavioural economists could make use of both this 
example and its historical priority to argue for an alternative paradigm to describe how agents do 
choose under uncertainty.  
Rabin and Thaler (2001, p.230) state that economists regarded the Allais Paradox as a 
“mere technicality” and fended off researchers who regarded EUT as challenged. This challenge 
only materialized once an alternative paradigm, such as that provided by prospect theory, became 
available. Contrary to the statement by Camerer and Lowenstein (2004) quoted in section 2, the 
Allais Paradox was sidelined as an embarrassing puzzle (more than as a “mere technicality”) but, 
absent the new paradigm, there was no active fending off.  As anticipated by Kuhn (1970), it is 
the presence of the new paradigm that converts an obscure puzzle into a crucial anomaly. 
There is a substantial body of experimental evidence that demonstrates that EUT gives a 
poor description of intertemporal choice and choice under uncertainty. Alluding to the famous 
Monty Python parrot sketch, Rabin and Thaler (2001) go so far as to describe expected utility as 
an ex-hypothesis. The Equity Premium Puzzle (Mehra and Prescott, 1985) shows that EUT also 
does  a  bad  job  outside  the  laboratory  –  see  also  Siegel  and  Thaler  (1997).  Nevertheless,  as 
Savage anticipated, the theory maintains considerable normative attraction. 
 
4.4.  Bargaining anomalies 
The  Ultimatum  Game  (UG)  was  devised  by  Güth  et  al  (1982).
2  In  the  UG,  the  first  party 
proposes a division of a “cake”, say $10, which must give the second party at least a small sum, 
say $1. The recipient then either accepts or rejects the division. If he rejects, neither party obtains 
                                                 
2 Rubinstein anticipated the UG in a brief remark at the end of a much more general paper (Rubenstein, 
1982). 13 
 
anything. The perfect equilibrium to this game in a one shot implementation is the offer of $1 
which is then accepted. The Güth et al (1982) experiment found that approaching one half the 
proposers made offers in excess of the minimum and a substantial minority or recipients rejected 
small offers. The UG is discussed in JEP feature articles by Thaler (1988b) and Camerer and 
Thaler (1995). 
 UG experimental results, which are known to be robust, are problematic in two respects. 
First, proposers are less selfish than simple theory suggests. Second, recipients punish proposers 
who are seen as having acted unfairly. The former problem is the more easily resolved since the 
proposer needs to take into account the possibility that the recipient will reject unfair offers. This 
remains true even when the minimum offer is substantial (Hoffman et al, 1996). Both Thaler 
(1988b) and Camerer and Thaler (1995) argue that the willingness to leave money on the table 
demonstrates  that  perceived  fairness  is  important  in  bargaining  contexts,  a  result  which  also 
extends across to games in which cooperation results experimentally even though it is not sub-
game perfect. The result, clearly positive for society, is at odds with traditional theory. 
 
4.5.  Anomalies and behavioural economics 
There is little point in attempting to date the birth of behavioural economics or asking who was 
the first behavioural economist. Economists have always considered themselves to be students of 
human  behaviour  and,  until  recently,  would  have  regarded  it  as  superfluous  to  add  the  tag 
behavioural to their professional description. The issue is not whether economics is behavioural 
but instead, what is the behavioural basis of economics.  
The more interesting question is, Who were the first economists to see themselves as 
behavioural as distinct from neoclassical. Herbert Simon is the main claimant to this role. His 
1955 paper, “A behavioral model of rational choice” is explicit in this regard (Simon, 1955). 
Simon  took  agents  to  be  boundedly  rational,  the  bounds  arising  from  the  impossibility  of 
obtaining full information and limits on human ability in processing the information which is 
available. The result is that agents typically employ heuristics which result in satisfactory but not 
optimizing outcomes. He regarded the neoclassical notion of rationality as inadequate but was 
interested in organizational decision making more than in economics itself. He was behavioural 
before behavioural economics was a distinct school. Only retrospectively can he be identified as 
the first behavioural economist. 14 
 
Given Simon’s status as the founding father of behavioural economics, it is remarkable 
that there is not a single reference to any of Simon’s work in any of Thaler’s 18 JEP feature 
articles. One reaction might be that this is a considerable achievement on Thaler’s part. A more 
reflective response is that this demonstrates that an important strand of behavioural economics 
and  finance,  and  that  reflected  in  Thaler  but  also  Shefrin,  owes  more  to  developments  in 
cognitive philosophy than to earlier aberrant strands in economics itself. While it is possible to 
rationalize the winner’s curse anomaly in terms of the employment of inadequate heuristics in the 
context  of  a complex  problem,  the  ultimatum  game  anomaly  and  anomalies  relating  both  to 
simple choice problems, where the decision problems are simple, are better explained in terms of 
framing  and  fairness  respectively  which  cannot  easily  be  accommodated  in  a  satisficing 
framework. For those taking the cognitive route, the start of behavioural economics is dated by 
the appearance of Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
3 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) do use the term “anomaly” but in an ordinary language 
and  not  a  technical  manner  –  “Many  anomalies  of  preference  result  from  the  editing  of 
prospects”. Named anomalies do not appear. I claim that Thaler invented named behavioural 
anomalies in economics drawing on the tradition on the effects literature in finance, although 
without explicit reference to Jensen. However, while Jensen looked to reinforce the EMH, Thaler 
created Kuhnian anomalies to expose the weaknesses of neoclassical theory in relation a new 
behavioural paradigm based on advances in cognitive psychology. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
Anomalies  only  became  anomalies,  rather  than  puzzles  or  paradoxes,  once  behavioural 
economics  was  available  as  an  alternative  paradigm  to  the  neoclassical  framework.  Not  all 
claimed  anomalies  presented  serious  challenges  in  that  direction.  Calendar  effects  and  other 
challenges  to  the  weak  form  EMH  are  neither  very  persuasive  nor  susceptible  to  clear 
behavioural explanation. Some behaviouralists have attempted to rewrite history such that the 
anomalies were always present but that forces anachronistic language onto an earlier generation 
of economists. Others, including Thaler himself, have used Kuhnian language to promulgate the 
                                                 
3 Kahneman and Tversky (1979) is referenced in five out of Thaler’s 18 JEP features. Kahneman et al 
(1991) is referenced in a further four of the features and Tversky and Kahneman (1981) in a further two 
giving a total score of 11/18. 15 
 
behavioural faith. Anomalies cease to be a category in the history and philosophy of science but 
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